Social Justice as a Field

Michael Strand

Abstract

This chapter proposes a field theory approach to morality and offers analysis of contemporary social justice as a moral field. Unlike moral formalism or moral background theory, moral field theory provides the sociology of morality a way of theorizing morality as objective while avoiding the philosophical tangle of realism and relativism. Moral field theory puts the onus on the construction of objective possibilities for moral belief and action, as moral fields emerge from an accumulated history and are produced and reproduced by socially constructive (orienting) loops between expectations and chances. As a field, morality is not subjective, neither is it conventionally group-based or directed by solidarity concerns; this allows it to assume a variety of forms capable of creating their own distinctive common sense. Moral field theory provides a framework that can account for morality as sui generis and thus it offers an at least partial affirmation of the intuition that history ("the arc of the moral universe") can *bend* toward justice.

M. Strand (✉)
Department of Sociology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
e-mail: mstrand@brandeis.edu

Keywords

Field theory · Morality · Social Justice · Probabilism · Objectivity

1 Introduction: The Peculiar History of Moral Reason

The philosopher Bernard Williams (1985) once called morality a "peculiar institution," a phrase he borrows from the historiography of enslavement. The analogy, if we are to believe Williams, is not as stretched as it might seem. Morality consists of "special obligations" that remain obligatory even when justification or deliberation can offer them no support. Morality implies that because you *ought* to do something you also *can* do it. Moral obligations do not change with our preferences not to be subject to them. "Morality makes people think," Williams continues, "that without its very special obligation, there is only inclination; without its utter voluntariness, there is only force; without its ultimately pure justice, there is no justice" (195–96). *Peculiarly*, then, morality makes us believe that if it were absent, the world would be a perilous place indeed: at best dictated by dumb luck, at worst by violent force. The "peculiar institution" of morality, then, is "a particular development of the ethical . . . it peculiarly emphasizes certain ethical notions rather than others, developing in particular a special notion of obligation" (Williams, 1985: 6).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

S. Hitlin et al. (eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Morality, Volume 2*, Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32022-4_23

For a morality critic like Williams, morality appears distinctly impractical. The demands it places on us ask too much of us. Morality can ask us to invest in peculiar kinds of stakes and take unusual risks. It consists of a potential to exercise power even alone and presumably unentangled with anyone else—to *test* us in other words. Yet, the traits that Williams finds puzzling or even dangerous about morality are, arguably, the same traits that allow morality to have its greatest societal and historical influence. In his critique, Williams unwittingly previews many of the telltale signs of morality that assumes the form of a *field* (Strand, 2015).

The question of any field's social existence ultimately comes down to the existence of non-random orientations. A field is not purely objective, in which case it can exist without any meaningful orientation; yet, it is also not purely subjective, in which case it would be made possible entirely by that orientation. The modality of a field is, instead, located somewhere between objectivity and subjectivity, between pure necessity and pure contingency. In Pierre Bourdieu's (1973) terms, a field consists of "objective potentialities immediately contained in the present, things to be done or not to be done, to be said or not said, which, as opposed to the future as 'absolute possibility' . . . has an urgency and a claim to existence excluding all deliberation" (64; see also Martin, 2003: 7). Fields have been conceived as sites of "objective relations," but, as Bourdieu suggests here, this obscures a more dynamic understanding of sites of "*objective potentialities*" (a phrase he draws from Max Weber; see Strand & Lizardo, 2022). Social relations simply refer to the most probable options or position-takings in a field that arise from the contest, by mutually oriented actors, to define and shape the field's objective potential.[1]

[1] Bourdieu (1983: 315) takes Michel Foucault to task on this point. Foucault's focus on "discourse" is relational but "refuses to consider the field of *prises the position* in itself and for itself" or the fact that relations are consequential only as they shape more or less probable action ("position-takings"). Only a field theory can explain that.

So what kinds of potential does a field objectively create? In Bourdieu's version of field theory, the answer centers on the appearance of a new form of capital as a distinct way of creating and evaluating worth. In any form, capital will involve a history of dispossession and an imperative to grow and accumulate. It is no different with moral capital. It allows for the grounds of expertise and specialized status. Yet a moral field can arise whenever practices are made the subject of struggle and tested according to their "ultimate," inherent value, which implies that all fields contain moral capital alongside economic and cultural dimensions. Like cultural capital, moral capital can serve to generate subjectivities that appear inherently "moral." We can find glimpses of a similar idea in Weber as he claims that "good fortune wants to be 'legitimate' fortune" (Weber, 1978/1921–22: 491). The successful or fortunate are not satisfied with what they have. As they accumulate economic and/or cultural capital, they may still lack moral capital. They may still *need* to pass a moral test. The protestant ethic appears as a religious appropriation of moral capital: a kind of moral capital that tests for distinctions of good and evil on the basis of a specifically religious prediction. A specifically moral field, by contrast, requires an additional, reflexive orientation toward morality itself, which increases with each differentiation specific to the field. Like economic capital, moral capital must accumulate, in this case by accumulating more situations and histories within its evaluation, testing them by the field's increasingly distinct criteria. An accumulation of moral capital coincides with a moral field as it resolves more contradictions and comes to be increasingly organized by what we might call morality *sui generis* ("of its own kind"). Here we see the institution of increasingly selective tests, or a selective test environment, in which whatever is accumulated by the field carries its distinct imprimatur and the potential to be different than it is. If we want a recipe for how a "new value" comes into the world, or the birth of a distinct "source of normativity," we might very well start here. Morality is not dependent on a field, importantly, and neither does morality need

a field to be socially significant. Yet, when fielded, morality carries the same unique markers as we can see with all newly emancipated fields: new capital, a new elite, and a new range of social action.

Moral fields are empirically available (and recordable) as historically and relationally formed beliefs that tend to group together and concern some claim on what is right and good that we can see is independent of group-level conventions. These beliefs stand apart from morality rooted in sympathy for consociates or norms (Tomasello, 2016: 129) or historically developed conventions that arise from sharing a living space (or being in a wider social space) and the appearance of distinct institutional demands (Douglas 1986). A moral field, by contrast, finds morality in its own representation rather than in the thing represented. As a field, morality becomes "post-conventional" as modes of perception and judgement potentially available to anyone, moving fluidly between groups, situations, and contexts. A moral field, likewise, rests on dispossession: specifically, the dispossession of those who would form moral beliefs for reasons the field would not find adequate. Yet, this dispossession gives a moral field its potential to broadly orient social change just as it does the potential to create symbolic violence in the expectation that certain moral beliefs *should* be shared by all others, even though the same conditions for believing are not universally accessible. Those who should believe will perceive barriers when instead of morality they find delegates speaking on its behalf, who may appear (socially, spatially, culturally) distant from their concerns, and who may refuse to acknowledge those concerns.

Rather than perform a functionary role, then, like group cohesion or restitution and repair, fielded morality creates moral importance and worth *sui generis* as more an end in itself as opposed to a means. As morality sui generis, a fielded morality must attempt something ambitious: namely, access to a universalist cognition, to formulate adequate reasons to believe that are, in principle at least, affected by nothing that would make them prohibitive for anyone trying to conceive them for themselves. This creates an occupational role for theorists and a capital stake in theory itself, the practical logic of the competition being one of "criss-crossing censorship" to reach purportedly purer, less corrupted sources of belief and to establish an orthodoxy on these grounds (Bourdieu, 1991).

Efforts to dictate the direction of a moral field typically occurs in these ways among an elite, whose attempts to define moral belief are tested by factors that impact the whole field. Further from the center of the field, morality sui generis mostly requires repetition and recurrence (not reinvention), which often means the field is condensed at this periphery to just a few practical tests, judgments, or phrases. These ways of asserting distinction though the initiation of tests, or "critical moments" of potential transformation, demonstrate the possibilities of a field and how they stand out against the implementation of other, competing possibilities (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006: 136ff). For instance, we can evaluate a situation according to a social justice criteria like "representation" linked to race, gender identity, and/or sexual orientation, as opposed to a purely economic criteria, like profit potential.

When social actors can expect their moral judgment and test (voiced, for instance, as a moral denunciation, project, or proposal) will find corresponding expectations in others, we can identify a *constructing loop*. This is what maintains the field's objective potential. The range of this loop might be bigger or smaller, its universe more or less diverse, and for those oriented to a moral field, its possibilities are both constraining and enabling. Those possibilities are objective, however, and do not rise or fall on subjective inputs like consensus or agreement. This is why an orientation to the field can mimic rule-following. While they could apply everywhere, moral fields are subject to boundary-making, especially nation-state borders. Potentially unlimited, moral beliefs can appear relative to the spatial and institutional range in which the field can command an orientation.

Like any field, moral fields create divisions of interest and importance through a condition of relative autonomy, a mark of distinction in comparison specifically with the moral conventions of

groups. Justice, for instance, may coincide entirely with the interests of a ruling class (however defined), yet a relatively autonomous social justice field will mediate those judgments, making it possible to contradict a ruling class interest (Krause, 2018a). With greater relative autonomy, moral fields can legitimize action as more distinctively *in the name of* morality in contrast to, say, profit, political power, knowledge, or technical efficiency (etc.). Changes in a moral field can ramify and affect all social action that it mediates.

On these grounds, moral field theory is distinguishable not only from institutionalism but from two contemporary competitors in the sociology of morality—moral formalism and moral background theory—and their commitments to more subjectivist and objectivist analysis (respectively). Moral formalism, for example, also finds all social situations and conditions to be potentially morally significant, particularly if as tests of the integrity of an actor's "intersituational identity." Moral significance, in this case, is apparent *subjectively* (Tavory, 2011). A moral field will reduce the chances a "moral situation" needs to be experienced subjectively *as* moral by giving situations an objective moral significance, with the capacity to make morality matter regardless of whether it is significant on any subjectively-defined terms.

Meanwhile, a moral field might be analytically specified as a "moral background" (Abend, 2014) of taken-for-granted precepts, concepts, and frameworks that construct a "public moral normativity" in a given time and place. In contrast to a field approach, however, moral background theory attempts to conceptualize a kind of conventional morality, the unreflexive possession of a group, typically at the scale of both large and diffuse populations. This contrasts with the post-conventional emphasis of a moral field, which segments morality not by group but rather by range of expectation (this is what makes moral fields "abstract"). A moral field is therefore less static and *objectivist* than a moral background, as a field accounts for the production of moral belief in a kind of contested foreground, making "the undiscussed" more noticeable. Moral fields could arise within larger moral backgrounds; we might also hypothesize that moral backgrounds are extinct moral fields, their debates long since passed, leaving only a congealed outcome.

Like these approaches in the sociology of morality, moral field theory is constructionist rather than normative: it does not argue what morality should be or make recommendations about how moral belief should be made (*pace* a "public sphere" argument; Habermas, 1988/1962). Yet, this does not mean that a field theory advocates moral relativism or realism. A realist holds that moral progress can occur by countering illusions of superstition, prejudice, and unquestioned custom in order to be made *true* (or false) by something in the world (or by a condition of absolute freedom). A relativist holds that moral beliefs are of necessarily limited range: relative to the practices and sociocultural circumstances of believers. We cannot, for example, confidently claim universal morality or immorality because we cannot identify sufficient uniformity in practices. These are broad simplifications to be sure, but a field approach stands apart from both relativism and realism and tries to clear the philosophical tangle by shifting the debate toward moral objectivity and conceptualizing moral objectivity as an *empirical* question. Morality is relative to a field's possibilities, yet those possibilities have an objective status with a potential not limited by preferred inputs like practices or truth.

For Durkheim (1984/1893), a moral order that doubles as social order must generate sufficient amounts of solidarity. A moral field is not bound by the same requirement, and so it has bearing on social change that happens potentially *because* of morality rather than something that morality secondarily fulfills, like social solidarity (Cohen, 1997). That fielded morality can transcend group segmentations and immediate solidarity needs is evidenced by the many forms (or topics) the objective possibilities of a field can assume and for persons to become *interested* in, i.e. morality as philosophy, state policy, esthetic or poetic expression, means of payment, knowledge claims, careers, occupations, (etc.). A field can initiate social change, then, through the broad

diffusion of its distinct possibilities, specifically by constructing more and more chances to be moral, to be perceived as moral, and to do moral action.

In what follows, I will argue that social justice is a moral field. I sketch the structure of the field and trace a genealogy of social justice around the three key positions of redistribution, representation, and recognition. The overall task is to explain "the way [a] competence for justice that can be attested in [a] society has taken shape," focused primarily on the contemporary USA (Boltanski, 2012: 39). As a method, field theory analyzes this competence by showing how positions in the field, recognizable for those seeking to realize specific interests in or through the field, are not eternal or inevitable but arise from an accumulated history.

From the perspective of field theory, social justice is distinguishable from both legal and divine justice and humanitarianism. Social justice also remains in large part bound by nation-state borders despite its global potential (Fraser, 2008). Mediation by the field makes an orientation to a situation, a social interaction, an object, a form of suffering, a statistic, a social relation (etc.) as *unjust* more or less likely and expected, thus expanding or contracting objective possibilities for moral action. Forms of judgment, modes of denunciation, proposed solutions, and moral projects, all become objectively probable or improbable. The field is the site of contests over this objective potential and thus over the moral capital of social justice: what it means, where it applies, and what can be expected of it.

2 Genesis of the Field

To trace the genesis of a social justice field is to write morality as history ("genealogy") by following resonant bits of *nomos ("custom")* as they form over time to shape the recognizable novelty and distinction of social justice. The challenge is to do this without making social justice static and unchangeable, as if in the future it will not be different. To give morality history is to orient toward and interpret the same objective possibility that constitutes it. The task is internal to the project. There is no "power of consecration" for collective beliefs outside of the cultural form itself. A genealogy cannot solidify what it describes, and sacrifice its dynamism, because it remains a possibility, a real potential. For the genealogy of social justice, differentiation has had to occur along two separate fronts: from religion and from law. The presence of social justice in a religious field (especially in a Catholic tradition) is distinctive from its presence as a field of its own. Since the medieval decline of "ordeals" (e.g., trial by water, fire, combat), a legal field obtained a monopoly on justice, featuring codified and procedural applications by experts and assigning responsibility to criminal acts (Foucault, 1971–72/2019; Kamali, 2019). A legal field often dictates how "valid" denunciations of injustice are made, and more generally how individuals are interpellated as de facto subjects of justice.

Seventeenth century jurists like Pufendorf and Grotius had been accused of claiming that law was not founded on divinity but instead on an ambiguous need for "sociality." Furthermore (and contra Hobbes), the goal of law was to preserve and enhance "sociality" rather than self-preservation (Moyn, 2010: chap. 1). All were participants in settling justice following the catastrophic Thirty Years War in which a fragmentation of justice for Catholics and Protestants precipitated the dissolution of an "abstract machinery for justice" and meant there "was no obvious alternative to violence" (Sutherland, 1992: 603; Wilson, 2009: 216). Writing over a hundred years after the war, William Blackstone (1765–1770/1916: 1492–93) would specify "social justice" as both participant in law but irreducible to it, reflecting the English legal tradition of "equity" as justice *without* law and with a marked absence of divine flavor when "society" prevails instead.

If the Westphalian system of states augured in a period of relative stasis following the collapse of divinely rooted law, specifically by trading it for a territorial coding, this returned in the context of "the Revolutionary Atlantic," in which social justice became increasingly distinct from religion

and law in its contest with *ancien regimes*. Saint-Just proposed "revolutionary justice" in the trial of King Louis XVI at the height of the French Revolution (Walzer, 1993), while a little while later the free Black man José Antonio Aponte was tried by a colonial judiciary for planning rebellions of enslaved people. In his own defense, Aponte put forward the claim that the colonial judiciary in Cuba no longer appropriated justice when he himself embodied "historic" justice (Childs, 2006). "Total revolution" more generally would appeal to the condemnation of social institutions, rather than inherent evil, as the main impediment to the full realization of human freedom, envisioning a total transformation of the "sub-political sphere of social interaction" including, but not limited to, political revolution (Yack, 1986: 10). The resulting controversy would inspire a reactionary fascination with tradition and generate partisan self-descriptions, in some sense remaining in place to the present day, distinguishable most of all by the presence or absence of *critique* (Boltanski, 2002).

The criticism that religion could not relieve worldly suffering but serve instead as, in Marx's (1970/1843) words, "a haven from a heartless world" would come to mark a test of religion that would shape social justice as a secular moral capital. So too would the young Marx's (1978/1843, 63) articulation, and repurposing of a phrase from the Abbé Sieyès *What is the Third Estate?*, of a revolutionary agent that can legitimately claim "I am nothing but I should be everything" serve as a touchstone for theoretical and practical efforts at accumulating moral capital by centering specific groups (the Combahee River Collective would later repurpose the phrase in a still different iteration). In this sense, Marx hints at two materializations of justice from the period following the Atlantic revolts that further distinguish social justice from divine and legal justice. First, divine justice played a role in anti-slavery campaigns, as evidenced by a figure like John Brown, but just as easily it was used to support slavery's continuation (Blackburn, 1990). The presence of anti-slavery law secured a denunciation of slavery as objectively possible, but the law could not suppress slavery unilaterally (Du Bois, 1998/1935; Williams, 1994/1944). Both legal and religious justice, thus, could be tried by social justice as irreducible, appearing increasingly *distinct* in its revelation of the limited, contradictory, and hypocritical promises of both law and religion. Second, the workhouse test, as documented by Polanyi (2001: 86–87), attempted to secure an objective judgment on whether poverty was just, giving it a primarily *moral*, as opposed to religious or legal, classification.

The nineteenth century iteration of social justice would assume a class focus, based on the appropriation of the equity spirit, a materialist philosophy, and total revolution by the nineteenth century socialism (Stedman Jones, 2004). This would produce an extensive vocabulary of exploitation, class, poverty, and inequality in its particular expiation of white male workers. Welfare states of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries marked a further materialization of the field in the form of protections against economic tests that made old age, unemployment, and sickness into "unjust outcomes" (Beveridge, 1942: 28). The language of social justice during this period revolved around "relations between classes" and, more generally, of the "social question." A labor-centric version of social justice in this mold is found in the International Labor Organization's 1944 Constitution, and its argument that "lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice" (Supiot, 2012: 148).

By the post-war period, then, social justice had been configured around *redistribution*, as materialized and institutionalized by welfare states (and actually existing socialisms), with political parties, public policies, and occupations structured accordingly. But the racial exclusions of the "affirmative" welfare programs that appeared in the wake of World War II, particularly in the USA (Katznelson, 2005), and embedded in the distinction given to wage-labor, the "white male breadwinner," and the Westphalian state, would generate a reorganization of the field's potential that would materialize in Civil Rights, the New Left, and further beyond.

The first known appearance of "affirmative action" comes in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, where it was designed to

recompense union members who had been discriminated against by employers, though similar engagement along "race-conscious" lines extend back to the Freedmen's Bureau Acts as part of Reconstruction following the US Civil War, and their premature end after 1877 (Du Bois, 1998/1935: chap. 14; Jones, 1993: 349). When the Kennedy administration codified affirmative action in 1961, this retained a "colorblind" orientation, as did the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and later executive orders by the Johnson administration (Skrentny, 1996: 7).

In one of the ironies of the social justice field, Richard Nixon would use affirmative action to scramble left and right constituencies by favoring antidiscriminationism focused on racial proportionality, marking a consequential political molding of the social justice field and *representation* as a type of moral capital. The so-called Philadelphia Plan "[required] that federally aided construction contractors submit a hiring schedule that within five years would produce a workforce that approximated the minority demographics of the metropolitan region." The plan appealed to Nixon's Machiavellian position-taking in the American political field, as he sought to "drive a wedge between two traditional Democratic constituencies, organized labor and Black civil rights" (Graham, 1996: 95–96; see also Skrentny, 1996: chap. 7). The Nixon Administration would also expand affirmative action policy to include gender alongside the racial categories specified in the 1970 order. In all cases, the Labor Department made proportionality the test to prove compliance with affirmative action (Anderson, 2004: 133ff).

Reduced enforcement with the Reagan administration meant that corporate "diversity management" has since enacted affirmative action by devising various proofs of compliance (Dobbin & Kavlev, 2021). Meanwhile, the consequential *Bakke vs. California* US Supreme Court decision in 1978 gave "diversity" its prevalent meaning in university settings, leaving admission offices in an equivalent position (Berrey, 2014). Diversity, however, is critiqued from a position-taking that recoups the original link between affirmative action and structural change: "By giving members of that subordinated group a greater share of the prized positions of society, we improve the relative position of that group and, in so doing, make a small but determined contribution to eliminating the caste structure. The social ordering of racial groups is altered" (Fiss, 1997: 37). This presents a test to the premise of equal opportunity tied to redistribution and the "white male breadwinner" as most likely to translate the socially instituted potentials of the field. By shifting away from a "white-centering diversity logic" (Mayorga, 2019), additional position-takings in the field avoid a hegemony critique of the legal field, reforging a connection despite earlier arguments in the social justice field that legal forms are corruptible through their connection to "carcerality" (Bernstein, 2017).

Second-wave feminism (beginning in the early 1970s) is the most critical position-taking in the social justice field over the last 50 years, because it objectively changes the possibilities that constitute the field and, therefore, the prevailing expectations of social action oriented to social justice (Fraser, 2008). Exemplary is the Combahee River Collective statement of 1977 and its emphasis on specific oppressions embodied by Black women: "If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessarily be the destruction of all the systems of oppression" (1978: 22–23). Elizabeth Armstrong (2002), meanwhile, documents competing logics in "gay and lesbian movements" in San Francisco between interest, redistribution, and identity, with the latter becoming more prominent after 1972. This did not signify a newfound interest in social justice. It signified a change to the field highlighted by second-wave feminism and epitomized in key events like Stonewall, "1968," and the emergence of nationalist and identity-oriented movements among Indigenous groups and peoples of color that presented modes of social injustice essentially unrecognizable to the field that had been established up to this point. The cumulative effect would be to render the social justice field *more* autonomous, or freed from outside influences, after its test of society had been politically appropriated and

given the comparatively narrow form as social welfare policy and antidiscriminationism.

By breaking with an antidiscriminationist focus, intersectionality would spearhead a further shift as theoretical tool that made moral capital, and more generally what social justice means, focus on the *recognition* of difference. The legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991; see also Butler, 2000) critiqued antidiscriminationism (and antiracist and feminist discourses) for ignoring discriminations that appear specifically at the intersection of "Black" and "woman." More generally, Crenshaw (1991: 1273) identifies a schism in the moral and political articulation of the claims "I am Black" and "I am a person who happens to be Black."" The dismissal of an imposed category, even if rooted in historic injury (Brown, 1993), as "contingent, circumstantial and nondeterminant" now marks a point of tension in the field, revolving around the question of recognition, not of nominal identities but of social communities (Collins, 2010). The sui generis moral appeal is for "policies that make members of disadvantaged groups comparatively more 'worthy' to their constituents in an effort to compensate for the lesser consideration they receive from the society at large or to curb the implicit 'privilege' still enjoyed by socially dominant groups" (Fourcade, 2016: 181).

The relative prevalence of positions in the field cannot be removed from material factors that serve to condition their objective possibility and the likelihood of result should a position be taken in the denunciation of injustice. The Ford Foundation shaped the material circumstances of both Black studies and Women's studies in the American university context during the post-Civil Rights era (Chamberlain & Bernstein, 1992; Rojas, 2007). Meanwhile, the growing link from the 1960s to present between social justice, academia and the US Democratic Party has further institutionalized relationships between social justice prerogatives and the codes of bureaucracy and political party (Watkins, 2018: 24).

Representation, *recognition*, and *redistribution* thus become major points of symbolic struggle as position-takings afforded by the field and its post-sixties possibilities. Given the role of theory in the field, differences between them can be marked by points of fracture that arise when we transform these positions into different conceptions of just social order: (1) unlike redistribution, representation and recognition are suspicious of commensuration and do not seek to eliminate an identity, (2) recognition can tend toward an open grounds of recognizable difference, while representation can tend to revolve around identity categories, often via mediation by "state categories" (Monk, 2022); (3) this provokes the dilemma of whether, as a question of moral capital, class difference should be recognized or represented in the same manner as other difference (racial, gender, sexual orientation). In the background for each of these points is (4) the question of whether all injustice is a mode of class injustice, or more generally how class injustice, as a historical marker in the field given its anticapitalist precedent, should be understood in relation to injustice in more dimensions. A present tension, inherited from this history, asks whether enacting justice without a redistributive aspect (whether along class lines or otherwise) can still constitute social justice (Reed, 2020).

3 Structure of the Field

This accumulated history precedes social action oriented to the field. Even without knowledge of it, any specific interest in social justice will mobilize this entire history in order to act, denounce, propose, argue, or express their concern and care about the specific suffering the field accumulates and claims to address. But what are those specific interests? And what, more specifically, is the structure of the social justice field at present?

Social justice is not criminal justice, and neither is it humanitarianism or human rights. It constitutes different objective possibilities and is "saturated" by a different history (Martin, 2003). Disparity, for example, becomes a key indicator for social justice, because it stabilizes what the field has historically prepared us to recognize. This makes it possible to demarcate a social justice issue as distinct from a criminal justice

issue (and make criminal justice a social justice issue). The latter only finds individuals as part of its trials, as it likewise trades in the rubric of responsibility (Lasagnerie, 2018). Social justice puts a far larger subject matter on trial (particularly policing itself), on the scale of groups, histories, and entire social orders. That it involves tests at all, and therefore allows for uncertainty of worth and responsibility, makes social justice different from humanitarianism, which tends to, instead, maintain basic human worth without uncertainty and without recognizing social difference, including the difference of nation-state borders (Dromi, 2020).

At present, social justice tends to scale nationally, making it like criminal justice but unlike humanitarianism's global scale. Despite persistent efforts to scale globally, social justice depends on specific categories that operate most effectively within nation-state boundaries (as opposed to human rights). The field is tightly linked to sovereign power and the political field, as capital in the field tends to correlate with those positions that can secure political authorization and transfer their position into policy or ally with a position-taking in a nationally bound political field in competitions over constituencies. Capital in the social justice field is largely applied and practical, even while it remains firmly linked to theory and social science. The lack of effective application mediums that scale globally alter its composition through an arbitrary nationalism, even if position-takings in the field have global potential. By contrast, humanitarianism dominates the global space in large part because of a practical apparatus (NGOs) that transcends local political fields (Krause, 2018b).

The social justice field lacks the formalization (at least so far) and proceduralism of the legal field. Yet with more degree-granting programs in "social justice" at US universities, social justice is increasingly organized around its own codes, rules, and terminologies, providing the grounds for a specialized expertise. Institutional recognition yields a formalized curriculum, knowledge specialization, and a credentialing system. The development and expansion of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) offices as part of educational institutions (Kwak et al., 2018), and diversity management and human resource departments in corporations provides additional recognition, job markets, and an institutional venue from which social justice can be formalized, requiring new experts to manage, teach, consult, and speak for it. Importantly, such departments are often separate from legal departments and do not require a legal credentialization, even though, in the US university context, they operate under the auspices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) whose jurisdiction is monopolized by the legal field. Nevertheless, particularly in the non-profit sector, and even in the humanitarian sector (with organizations like CARE), "social justice jobs" find increasing designation as such.

Only because capital, or a control on the future, has accumulated do authorities develop who can exercise power over the capital that others claim to have. Redistribution, representation, and recognition refer to the different varieties of moral capital available in the field that can be converted into denunciations, moral projects, and even occupations (Dahl et al., 2004; Fraser, 2008). Each position features a criticism of the other, along with refracting the meaning of key moral categories of liberal discourse, like "merit" and "desert." They are also linked to categories like "white supremacy," "heteronormativity," and "decolonization," of both theoretical and political resonance, that introduce tests of objects (syllabi, clothing, technology) and habits (dress codes, interaction styles, modes of speech). Part of their conceptual network encompasses social scientific categories like "structure," "culture," and "identity." More generally, this network finds extension in statistics and the measurement of probabilities, as an objective referent, often used for demonstrative purposes to show disparities. Social structure and social identity, which mediation by the field has since come to mark, are brought within social justice's distinct axiology (Bonilla-Silva, 2015). This signifies a dual position-taking in a political field, but one prepared and motivated by prior extensions of justice. Structure and identity do not remain of silent appraisal; in becoming

extensions of justice they become anything but chance. We therefore cannot have a lack of scruple about them, which invites a wider gaze onto socializing work in venues (like education) that transmit these appraisals in ways that potentially restitute existing social relations, engaging in an explicit or more often implicit devaluation of them.

All these links condense into the moral, social-scientific, and juridical ideals of social justice as found in claimsmaking, issue-generation and strategy. But more than "relatively autonomous" categories or cultural assumptions, they are probable tokens of resonance within the "peculiar doxa" (common sense) of the social justice field, based on learning its objective possibilities and honing expectations accordingly (Mayrl, 2013: 304). In the proliferation of "justices" (e.g., racial justice, gender justice, queer justice, reproductive justice, environmental justice), language and categories made available by the field's accumulated history, and marked by the social position of its users, find an expanding universe of possibilities. The familiarity of this should not now obscure how these positions emerged as the initial taking of *improbable* positions, in particular waged against what had become a hierarchized corps, who controlled both the means and meaning of social justice, in post-war welfare states.

4 Moral Agency in the Field

Social justice tries to situate a moral judgment in what are otherwise distributions and arrangements that, in relation to the field, are ordered by different expectations. Social justice retains its own moral immanence in such situations. Its potentials are its own even if this does not make them effective on its own. Spaces become contested and counter-hegemonic when they must hold together through mediation by the field, changing the rules and consensus that prevails, of "social contracts" made and forgotten, whose invisibility (and seeming inviolability) simply prevents orders from breaking down. Social justice changes expectations by recasting the "benign," "neutral," or purely "practical" toward skewed probabilities, persistent disparities, and social inequities.

Despite many accommodations made by the field, moral agents can always make a judgment; they can denunciate this or that situation as unjust and find matching expectations in others. Who does the denunciation matters in relation to the field's objective possibilities, in addition to what they denunciate and how. Each element of the sequence, each point of focus and tactic, can change, though the change is not random. The *who*, *what*, and *how* of typical denunciations change as the factors that dictate their objective possibility change. So too does the *why* of a denunciation, which arises as an answer to the question: what project does it serve within the field?

A denunciation can be a call to attention, a plea, an insistence, a performance, and a demand for action. The denunciation of injustice must have illocutionary effects to draw its possibility into existence (Houston & Pulido, 2002). The field makes it likely that denunciations will work by anticipating the expectations of others. The loop can sustain a given mode of denunciation, even for many years. It is not guaranteed to occur or stick around, however, and neither is the denunciation entirely random, a total gamble, of which nothing can be expected. Rather, the field, and its myriad constituting elements, signal only the objective existence of the possibility or potential that judging this or that to be unjust will find matching expectations in public.

Statistics are commonly used for the purposes of denunciation, to reveal disparities in outcomes and how these could not have happened by chance. Filmmaking and photography, particularly with a documentary focus but not limited to this, appeal to evidence of sight and sound to deliver categories of vision and division from the field. Brought into the field, these tools are given new significance. Social scientific concepts like culture, identity, and structure are likewise applied to reform the meaning of justice, creating new tests and projected arrangements, new standards with which to denunciate and recommend. Such applications are not tests of social theory, as in a standard social science model,

but create new trials with which to assign responsibility, construct moral scales and definitions of worth, and representations of a social order as an unjustifiable moral order.

This logic of trial-making can also serve as a point of symbolic competition in a social justice field. What activists sometimes decry as "Oppression Olympics" indicates a contest of more or less "important" issues and identities, which in turn disputes the meaning of social justice itself (Davis & Martinez, 1998: 298). Universalization can occur as a contest of identities most subject to injustice, most marginalized, most excluded, or whose "sufferings are universal" in Marx's words. Crenshaw (1989: 167) makes an analogous point referencing the nineteenth century Black scholar-activist Julia Cooper: "If ... efforts instead began with addressing the needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged and with restructuring and remaking the world where necessary, then others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit . . . The goal of this activity should be to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups for whom it can be said: 'When they enter, we all enter.'"

The major agents in the social justice field include *the theorist*, *the activist,* and *the organizer*. A theorist is not typically situated only within the social justice field. They trade the capital available here to take positions in other fields and also transfer field-specific capital from other fields into the social justice field. This can also involve a dual reference between fields outside of social justice and their concerns (*illusio*) and those that mark the social justice field. For instance, in the call for prison and policing abolition, prominent theorists participate simultaneously in the social justice field and in different knowledge fields, respectively (law, geography, Women's and Gender Studies, Black Studies), the dual reference lending a distinct quality to their work (Alexander, 2006; Davis, 2003; Gilmore, 2017). As in the legal field, theorists provide upstream legitimacy to actions and beliefs downstream that may seem arbitrary without this symbolic legitimacy. Competition among theorists matters more directly in the social justice field than it does in a legal field, however, which also means the objective possibility of social justice can acquire a theoretical aspect that can stand noticeably in contrast to unthought practical assumptions. This is evident in broad diffusions of linguistic capital, words to use (e.g., preferred pronouns, identity categories, terms and acronyms of recognition and alliance), how and when to use them, often not based on being taught explicit rules (which would mimic the study of law) but as tacitly acquired expectations and anticipations. Objective possibilities attach to these words as what we might call nomadic instruments of the field with the potential to be transposed across situations.

Importantly, this division of labor means that whether actions are outward- or inward-facing in relation to the field, specific judgments can be *separated* from the persons making them, rendering them less vulnerable to the arbitrariness that would come if those judgments were merely subjective, or treated as unfielded moral interpretations. The imprimatur of theory can depersonalize the judgment and action in not being directly attributable to an individual but more like the actualization of an objective potential. Unlike a juridical logic, social justice does not typically take individuals as a priori. More typically, social justice discourse involves second-order categories, including those (race, gender, class, sexual orientation) given approval by state categorization (Monk, 2022) and those reflecting designations more specific to the field (often to capture a specific state of minoritization and/or marginalization). These are not otherworldly in the manner of religious classification (e.g., "the saved" versus "the damned" as different salvation potentials and after-life fates). The social justice field uses moral classifications, instead, to approach the world from a stance of fact-making: tracking commonalities, patterns, tensions, and more specifically disparities, as demonstrable on the grounds of actuality.

An *activist* often has facility with field-derived terminologies and strategies, of distinctions and differences, and forms of rebuttal, thus turning theory into practice. Their modes of action generally include a social movement repertoire. Activists tend to be local in a territorial sense,

and locally responsive to social justice issues of potential global reach. Their occupation is typically not in a social justice career. Nevertheless, a social justice field can inspire a full commitment, such that it motivates a transformative lifestyle, with moral tests shaping the potential of many actions and decisions. This commitment passes a logic of trial by demonstrating concern about social issues while overcoming suspicion about the *arbitrariness* of one's concern, combining this with an aversion to pure sentiment as might be connoted by charity. As the social justice field became more expert in its materialization as the welfare state, the post-sixties pivot challenged its production of knowledge (Agar, 2008). In a more contemporary sense, then, "bad faith" can prevail among activists around suspicion about commitment, particularly when knowledge of issues is remote and pedagogical (*about* the issue) for some, while it is directly gained through lived experience, for others.

The *organizer* serves as the most direct link between the social justice field and social movements as a fundamental, extra-legal and political tool at the disposal of the field's projects. Organizers are involved in changing, adapting, and applying social movement repertoires in ways that align with field-oriented categorizations, which are themselves distillations of theoretical knowledge. This often involves phrases (e.g., "Black Lives Matter") that center a specific category and enable inclusion or universalization on the basis of that category. Thus, the organizer occupies a position between theorist and activist, operates on broader territorial scales than the activist, can have an occupational involvement in the field, and negotiates between theory and practice as a tension inherited from the history of the field and its structure (Trudeau, 2021).

The focus of organizers centers on devising strategies that often galvanize around specific events, and prove to be *event-making*, particularly to symbolically center a category of person and an associated injustice. When looped into media fields, and the broader attention economy, particularly on the user-generated content platforms of social media, this can propel events quickly ("virally") into networked consciousness, though in this form social justice does not present itself as ideological in the commonly understood sense (Carney, 2016; Tufecki, 2017). Neither, however, is it (or these tactics) prefigurative.

The tension of theory and practice common to social justice praxis is presented here as a structural tension between theorists, activists and organizers, which translates further into other tensions in the relations between these three social justice agents. As the organizer makes events, tensions may arise with activists in the transformation of the particular and local (unfolding in tragic circumstances) into a social justice issue. When theorists shape field potentials more, a hermeneutics of suspicion or a sense of vulnerability, particularly about knowledge and its sources, can become a principal mechanism for accumulating moral capital. When organizers have precedence in the field, organization and institution-building occurs, often coinciding with the creation of occupational and career stakes in the field, typically involved with altering existing organizational forms as found in corporations or educational institutions. When activists have more prominence, the protest and all its attendant vulnerabilities and embodied risks become the prevailing route to the field's capital.

5 Conclusion

To tell whether morality is a field, "peculiarity" might be a good metric, as reflected in the distinct effects of which Williams told us at the start. This corresponds to a moral field's distinct *test*. The division of mental and manual labor remains integral to the structure of social justice as a field, just as it does any field. Hence, the form social justice takes varies for social actors depending on their relation to its inner limits. The theorist stands in firmest grasp of explicit codes, as the most prevalent of these (representation, recognition, redistribution) correspond to positions in the field and their distinctive tests. The activist and organizer are more distantly situated from the center. For

them, the field is more like a mediator than an intermediary, as they engage in application, citation, and event-making. These different types of moral agency find themselves arrayed around the objective possibility of social justice; alongside them, social justice jobs might indicate a growing solidification of the field in its present configuration. That configuration features a shared orientation toward the objective possibility of a world where all can participate and none will suffer; a world free of inequalities and inequities. Such orientations mediate moral concerns that the field does not create, as if they never appeared before, but gives expression to, brings recognition of, and makes meaningful. The field, as a site of specialized production and circulation, dispossesses "laypersons of the instruments of symbolic production" (Bourdieu, 1979: 81) to express those concerns. But therein lies its power, its history and world-making capacity.

Social justice affects social change not primarily as a symbolic system of meaning or as the illocutionary force of a performance, but as all fields do: by creating a space of objective chances or potentials that shape expectations and, distinctively, can turn action into *social* action by giving it a significance recognizable to others as the achievement of specific interests, with certain justifiable motivations, as part of a project that has duration over time. Suppose we agree with philosophers like Cohen (1997) that the injustice of human enslavement explains its demise in specific cases, and more generally, the very fact that enslavement is immoral accounts for the instability of all social formations that depend on it (see also Moore, 1978). This is only a potential, however, not a guarantee. Perhaps we can imagine many situations that bear an inherent immorality, but may not be made a site of struggle, with a particular interest in that, capable of generating its own moral capital, as in a field, or perhaps they are, but it is not a moral field. Moral field theory can bring attention to these variations, which in the sociology of morality, we might call a mid-range, mesolevel, and middling term kind of focus.

The social justice field does not emerge as "moral development" (Habermas, 1979), as part of history only as a kind of irreversible forward momentum, of stages and progress we might say, which raises an important point. I have suggested that a social justice field is capable of bending "the arc of the moral university" or "history" toward justice, but what does this mean? I want to take the Reverend Theodore Parker (who uttered words along these lines in 1852) and Martin Luther King Jr (who famously restated them) literally: history would otherwise go along an its inscrutable and brutal course, and the events that contain a moral potential do not contain morality sui generis (as we must be place there). The potential force of a field (a "vector" in classical field theory; Martin, 2003) can *bend* this history. We can be very material about this claim. A social justice field bends history by accumulating events and giving them a direction, by allowing history to be affected by an orientation, specifically by arranging history around an objective possibility, making history about that objective possibility and inspiring an accumulation of moral capital. The irony is that the field itself appears as the result of events, rather than by design, that draw attention to justice in this particular mold, as a site of various forms of contest, including a reflexive contest over the symbolic power of its meaning. Williams calls this a "vindicatory genealogy," which recovers its object as history but does not reconstitute it as contingent and disputable. To model social justice, as I have attempted here, as a field is not to render it in such a way as to embolden its enemies, or draw suspicion about it as a particular product of history. It is to vindicate its existence, *keep* it existing and existing better. Our orientations to social justice, however they are expressed, are not our own. And we could not have those orientations should we have to rely on established powers like the economically wealthy, the religiously justified, and the politically powerful, as opposed to a moral field. As Douglas (1986: 124) puts it, questions of justice cannot be answered by "private ratiocination," but neither are they ever answered inside a power vacuum. Within a field, the answers are mediated by what will probably meet the approval of, or at least be reflected in, the collective contest over the meaning of social justice,

particularly among those with the most worth according to the field. To argue for moral field theory, we cannot say that resonance—of claims, denunciations, proposals—is a matter of truth or problem-solving. When something is fielded, its resonance is a looping expectation: the chances created by the field meet with expected chances (anticipation, prediction). Fraser (2008) calls out the potential for hegemony in the social justice field; as it lends moral capital to some injustice, it renders other injustice silent by reducing its chances of being symbolic. Using this analysis to assist such a counter-hegemonic strategy is how moral field theory can justify itself in terms conducive to the field.

References

Abend, G. (2014). *The moral background*. Princeton University Press.

Agar, J. (2008). What happened in the sixties? *British Journal for the History of Science, 41*, 567–600.

Anderson, T. (2004). *The pursuit of fairness: A history of affirmative action*. Oxford University Press.

Alexander, J. (2006). *The Civil Sphere*. Oxford University Press.

Armstrong, E. (2002). *Forging gay identities: Organizing sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994*. University of Chicago Press.

Bernstein, E. (2017). The sexual politics of the 'New Abolitionism'. *Differences, 18, 128–151*.

Berrey, E. (2014). *The enigma of diversity: The language of race and the limits of racial justice*. University of Chicago Press.

Beveridge, W. (1942). *Social insurance and allied services*. Macmillan.

Blackburn, R. (1990). *The overthrow of colonial slavery*. Verso.

Blackstone, W. (1765–1770/1916). *Commentaries on the Laws of England*. Callaghan and Company.

Boltanski, L. (2002). The left after May 1968 and the longing for total revolution. *Thesis Eleven, 69*, 1–20.

Boltanski, L. (2012). *Love and justice as competences*. Polity.

Boltanski, L., & Thevenot, L. (2006). *On justification: Economies of worth*. Princeton University Press.

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2015). The structure of racism in color-blind, 'post-racial' America. *American Behavioral Scientist, 59*, 1358–1376.

Bourdieu, P. (1973). Three forms of theoretical knowledge. *Social Science Information, 12*, 53–80.

Bourdieu, P. (1979). Symbolic power. *Critique of Anthropology, 79, 77–85*.

Bourdieu, P. (1983). The field of cultural production; or the economic world reversed. *Poetics, 12, 311–356*.

Bourdieu, P. (1991). The peculiar history of scientific reason. *Sociological Forum, 6*, 3–26.

Brown, W. (1993). Wounded attachments. *Political Theory, 21, 390–410*.

Butler, J. (2000). Appearances aside. *California Law Review, 88*, 55–63.

Carney, N. (2016). All lives matter, but so does race: Black lives matter and the evolving role of social media. *Humanity and Society, 40*, 180–199.

Chamberlain, M., & Bernstein, A. (1992). Philanthropy and the emergence of women's studies. *Teachers College Record, 93*, 556–568.

Childs, M. (2006). *The 1812 Aponte rebellion in Cuba and the struggle against Atlantic slavery*. UNC Press.

Cohen, J. (1997). The arc of the moral universe. *Philosophy & Public Affairs, 26*, 91–134.

Collins, P. (2010). The new politics of community. *American Sociological Review, 75, 7–30*.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: Black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 139–168.

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics and violence against women of color. *Stanford Law Review, 43*, 1241–1299.

Dahl, H., Stoltz, P., & Willig, R. (2004). Recognition, redistribution and representation in global capitalist society: An interview with Nancy Fraser. *Acta Sociologica, 47*, 374–382.

Davis, A. (2003). *Are prisons obsolete?* Seven Stories Press.

Davis, A., & Martinez, E. (1998). Coalition building among people of color: A discussion with Angela Y. Davis and Elizabeth Martinez. In *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*. Blackwell.

Dobbin, F., & Kavlev, A. (2021). The civil rights revolution at work: What went wrong. *Annual Review of Sociology, 47*, 281–303.

Douglas, M. (1986). *How institutions think*. Syracuse University Press.

Dromi, S. (2020). *Above the fray: The red cross and the construction of the humanitarian relief sector*. University of Chicago Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1998/1935). *Black reconstruction in America*. Free Press.

Durkheim, E. (1984/1893). *The division of labor in society*. The Free Press.

Fiss, O. (1997). Affirmative action as a strategy of justice. *Philosophy & Public Policy, 17*, 37–38.

Foucault, M. (1971–72/2019). *Penal theories and institutions*. Palgrave.

Fourcade, M. (2016). Ordinalization. *Sociological Theory, 34*, 175–195.

Fraser, N. (2008). Abnormal justice. *Critical Inquiry, 34*, *393–422*.

Gilmore, R. (2017). Abolition geography and the problem of innocence. In G. T. Johnson & A. Lubin (Eds.), *Futures of black radicalism*. Verso.

Graham, H. (1996). Richard Nixon and civil rights: Explaining an enigma. *Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26*, 93–106.

Habermas, J. (1979). *Communication and the evolution of society*. Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1988/1962). *The structural transformation of the public sphere*. MIT Press.

Houston, D., & Pulido, L. (2002). The work of performativity: Staging social justice at the University of Southern California. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 20*, 401–424.

Jones, J. (1993). The Affirmative Action/Quota Issue: Back to the Future in the Year 2000? *University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, 15*, 361–381.

Kamali, E. (2019). *Felony and the guilty mind in medieval England*. Cambridge University Press.

Katznelson, I. (2005). *When affirmative action was white*. Basic Books.

Krause, M. (2018a). How fields vary. *British Journal of Sociology, 69*, 3–22.

Krause, M. (2018b). *The good project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the fragmentation of reason*. University of Chicago Press.

Kwak, N., Gavrila, S., & Ramirez, F. (2018). Enacting diversity in American Higher Education. In *Universities as agencies*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lasagnerie, G. (2018). *Judge and punish: The penal state on trial*. Stanford University Press.

Martin, J. (2003). What is field theory? *American Journal of Sociology, 109*, 1–49.

Marx, K. (1970/1843). *Critique of Hegel's philosophy of right*. Cambridge University Press.

Mayorga, S. (2019). The white-centering logic of diversity ideology. *American Behavioral Scientist, 63*, 1789–1809.

Mayrl, D. (2013). Fields, logics and social movements: Prison abolition and the social justice field. *Sociological Inquiry, 83*, 286–309.

Monk, E. (2022). Inequality without groups: Contemporary theories of categories, intersectional typicality, and the disaggregation of difference. *Sociological Theory, 40*, 3–27.

Moore, B. (1978). *Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt*. M.E. Sharpe.

Moyn, S. (2010). *The last utopia: Human rights in history*. Harvard University Press.

Polanyi, K. (2001). *The great transformation*. Beacon.

Reed, T. (2020). *Toward freedom: The case against race reductionism*. Verso.

Rojas, F. (2007). *From black power to black studies: How a radical social movement became an academic discipline*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Skrentny, J. (1996). *The ironies of affirmative action: Politics, culture and justice in America*. University of Chicago Press.

Stedman Jones, G. (2004). *An end to poverty? The historical debate*. Columbia University Press.

Strand, M. (2015). The genesis and structure of moral universalism: Social justice in Britain, 1834-1901. *Theory and Society, 44*, 537–573.

Strand, M., & Lizardo, O. (2022). Chance, orientation, and interpretation: Max Weber's neglected probabilism and the future of social theory. *Sociological Theory, 40*, 124–150.

Supiot, A. (2012). *The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social justice vs. the total market*. Verso.

Sutherland, N. M. (1992). The origins of the Thirty Years War and the structure of European politics. *English Historical Review, 424*, 587–625.

Tavory, I. (2011). The question of moral action: A formalist position. *Sociological Theory, 29*, 272–293.

The Combahee River Collective. (1978). A black feminist statement. In *Capitalist patriarchy and the case for socialist feminism*. Monthly Review Press.

Tomasello, M. (2016). *A natural history of human morality*. Harvard University Press.

Trudeau, E. (2021). *The anatomy of a social justice field: The growth, collaboration, and dissonance of the modern U.S. anti-trafficking movement*. Doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame

Tufecki, Z. (2017). *Twitter and tear gas: The power and fragility of networked protest*. Yale University Press.

Walzer, M. (1993). The King's trial and the political culture of the revolution. In *Regicide and revolution*. Columbia University Press.

Watkins, S. (2018). Which feminisms? *New Left Review, 109*, 5–76.

Williams, B. (1985). *Ethics and the limits of philosophy*. Fontana Press.

Williams, E. (1994/1944). *Capitalism and slavery*. University of North Carolina Press.

Wilson, P. (2009). *The Thirty Years War: Europe's tragedy*. Harvard University Press.

Yack, B. (1986). *The longing for total revolution: Philosophic sources of discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche*. University of California Press.

Michael Strand is an assistant professor of sociology at Brandeis University. His research interests revolve around theory, culture, and morality. His recent work has appeared in *Sociological Theory, Theory and Society*, *Science, Technology & Human Values*, and *Thesis Eleven*.